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1. INTRODUCTION 
In August 2013, the CEO of Tesla Motors and SpaceX, Elon Musk, released a design document 
for a new high-speed transportation concept: the Hyperloop (SpaceX, 2013). This new system 
would transport passengers and cargo within pressurized capsules that travel through tubes at 
similar or higher speeds than air travel. As an example, the proponents of this technology state that 
the Hyperloop can make a trip between Los Angeles and San Francisco in 35 minutes. Since the 
release of the original design concepts, many other routes have been considered by dedicated 
academic teams and consultancy companies, these include: Helsinki-Stockholm (KPMG, 2016), 
Paris-Amsterdam (Delft Hyerloop, 2016), or Toronto-Montreal (Transpod, 2016). Hyperloop One, 
the leading company in the development and commercialization of Hyperloop technology, is 
collaborating with local authorities to carry out feasibility studies for both passenger and cargo 
routes in the United Arab Emirates (BBC, 2016) and Russia (RT, 2016). At this early stage, 
however, the costs and timescales of these projects remain unclear.  
Leaving aside the debate on the technological feasibility and marketability of the Hyperloop, which 
still has to overcome more than a few hurdles (DOT, 2016; MTR, 2016), this paper is focused on 
exploring the impact that such a disruptive innovation would hypothetically have on other transport 
modes, particularly on air travel. The existing literature on high-speed rail (HSR) is a good 
reference for the relevant economic and social effects that could apply to the Hyperloop. On top of 
the well-established impacts on regional population, employment, economic activity, and land 
values (Sands, 1993), Wang et al., (2016) notes that the “time-space compression” created by HSR 
can lead to improved regional accessibility and foster economic interactions between regions. Chen 
et al. (2016) also refers to the impacts of HSR on travel behaviour and household mobility, since 
improved employment and housing opportunities open the door for residential relocation for many 
families, particularly if there is a significant gap in salaries or home values between the connected 
regions (Clark and Davies, 1999).  
In regards to the impact of HSR on air transport, Dobruszkes et al. (2014) provides a comprehensive 
review of studies on HSR-induced intermodal effects and concludes that a substitution effect 
between airlines and HSR in short-haul routes is generally observed (depending on travel speeds). 
However, there is also a potential for HSR to feed long-haul routes at hub airports where the 
frequency of long-haul services is high (also noted by Albalate et al., 2015). Taking this idea a step 
further, Takebayashi (2015) analysed the possibility of a leakage of demand between airports 
facilitated by air-rail connectivity. Using a theoretical model, the authors showed that, if a HSR 
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connection was available between two airports of different sizes, a leakage in long-distance 
passenger demand towards the largest airport will occur. This seems a reasonable effect due to 
existence of a connectivity gap - not unlike the salary gap mentioned above -, in which the higher 
number of frequencies and destinations available at larger airports can incentivise air passengers 
in the vicinity of a small airport to travel to other regions when choosing a point of departure. Thus, 
improved HSR connectivity can help large airports to capture air-rail transfer passengers from the 
smaller airports’ catchment areas. Empirical proof of these impacts was provided by Terpstra and 
Lijesen (2014), who analysed the Amsterdam-Brussels and Madrid-Barcelona HSR corridors, as 
well as the surrounding multi-airport regions. Their analysis is based on a framework that predicts 
that the catchment areas of airports with intermodal access expand after HSR is introduced. Using 
a multinomial logit (MNL) model based on access times, fares, and frequencies, they show that, in 
line with Takebayashi’s prediction, the largest airports tend to benefit more from HSR connectivity 
by capturing demand from their competitors. 
Terpstra and Lijesen’s empirical estimates brought by the interaction between airports and HSR 
support the idea that airport catchment areas could be similarly affected by the introduction of the 
Hyperloop. However, the extent of this impact remains unclear, as the highly disruptive nature of 
this innovation makes past HSR impact studies not entirely comparable in terms of, for example, 
travel time savings. Therefore, the main contributions of this paper are to investigate how a 
hypothetical Hyperloop service between San Francisco and Los Angeles’ metropolitan areas could 
affect the mobility of air passengers by means of air-Hyperloop connectivity, and to determine the 
implications in terms of airport competition and passenger leakage in long-distance domestic 
markets within a context of substantial connectivity gaps amongst the main commercial airports in 
California. In line with previous studies, our working hypothesis is that the largest airport (e.g. Los 
Angeles International - LAX) stands to benefit the most from a new Hyperloop service. 
To that end, we carried out an exploratory analysis of airport accessibility and catchment areas with 
the goal to model the choice of departure airport by long-distance domestic airline passengers 
originating from California. In addition, we also estimated how that choice could be affected by 
the introduction of the aforementioned Hyperloop service. While the determination of airport 
catchment areas is usually based on passenger surveys that indicate the place of residence (or stay) 
of passengers and visitors (CAA, 2011), that approach is not easily scalable to cover the entire 
Californian airport network. Previous attempts to measure airport catchment areas in large regions, 
e.g. the European network, use simple geographical criteria, such as Maertens (2012) who defined 
a 100 km radius around the airports. In a more advanced approach, Lieshout et al. (2015) relied on 
econometric models based on fares, frequencies, and access times as drivers of passenger choice 
(Ashford and Bencheman, 1987; Harvey, 1987; Windle and Dresner, 2002; Pels et al., 2001, 2003; 
Hess and Polak, 2005, 2006). Lieshout et al. (2015) built on a methodology previously developed 
by Lieshout (2012) to calculate the market shares of Amsterdam Airport in surrounding 
municipalities based on a simplified Multinomial Logit (MNL) structure. The MNL model links 
the utility of each travel alternative available to the passenger to a function of route-specific 
frequencies and generalized travel costs that bundle access times, access costs, airfares, and flight 
times. This is the approach that we adapt to our case study. The methodology combines publicly 
available data on airline bookings for June 2015 (obtained from the US Department of 
Transportation), OAG flight schedules, and additional information on local population and 
transport accessibility that was compiled using Geographical Information Systems as well as 
airport-specific passenger surveys available online.  
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Our results can have implications on the economic impact assessments of Hyperloop services 
connecting major cities with separate airport systems, as the potential mobility of passengers in 
long-haul air transport markets should be added to the already established effects on household and 
work mobility. Quantifying the potential increase in short-term airport competition could help the 
affected parties in planning their long-term responses to the introduction of the new mode of 
transport. In particular, this paper can shed light on hidden weaknesses in airport offerings that 
could become actual threats for passenger leakage in the event of a sudden increase in competition.   
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our case study and also describes 
the methodology to determine airport catchment areas, including the required datasets. Section 3 
presents the predicted catchment areas before and after the Hyperloop is introduced and discusses 
the implications for airports, airlines, and passengers. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the main 
findings of the paper. 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Case study and datasets 
Our case study focuses on long-distance domestic markets, comprising all itineraries that originate 
in California and end in another US state, flown during an average week of June 20151.  
The reason to exclude short-distance travel (i.e. within California) is to focus on routes in which 
Hyperloop and air travel can act as complements, instead of substitutes, thus facilitating the 
identification of potential airport leakage effects as discussed in the previous section. The reason 
to exclude international travel from our study is simply the lack of reliable data on international 
airfares. The total demand consists of 991,432 airline bookings to 328 destinations obtained from 
the OAG Traffic Analyser. Figure 1 shows the distribution of California domestic air travel demand 
per destination state. Half of the passenger demand is concentrated in just nine states, these are (in 
decreasing order): Texas, Washington, New York, Nevada, Hawaii, Illinois, Florida, and Colorado. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of California domestic air travel demand per destination state: avg. week June 2015 
Sources: OAG Traffic Analyser 
                                                     
1 The choice of an average week of June is linked to the availability of our flight schedules dataset, from which the air 
connectivity indicators required for the MNL model are calculated. Using data from sample months/weeks is common 
in this type of studies (previous papers on airport choice in the Bay Area employ travel surveys carried out in August 
and October 1995, e.g. Pels et al., 2003; Hess and Polak, 2006). While indeed schedules data is much easier to obtain 
than passenger surveys, note that we still depend on passenger surveys to calibrate the parameters in our model (See 
Table 4 below). The passenger surveys used in this paper were carried out in April and July 2015 (LAX) and May 
2015 (SFO). Our June sample falls within that interval. Looking at DOT data, we found that the second quarter of the 
year is the one closest to the annual monthly average for Californian long-distance domestic markets. In spite of that, 
we recognize that potential seasonal distortions may limit the interpretation of our results. When data becomes 
available (both airline schedules and passenger surveys), this same study could be expanded to other months. 
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All these bookings originate from the twelve busiest airports in California, according to annual 
commercial passenger traffic in 2015 as reported by the US Federal Aviation Administration. All 
other airports in California serve primarily general aviation. Our sample airports are divided into 
two regions: Northern California and Southern California. The Northern cluster comprises the 
following five airports: San Francisco (SFO), Oakland (OAK), and San Jose (SJC) in the Bay Area, 
as well as Sacramento (SMF), and Fresno (FAT). The Southern cluster comprises the following 
seven airports: Los Angeles (LAX), Burbank (BUR), Long Beach (LGB), Santa Ana (SNA), and 
Ontario (ONT) in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Area, as well as Palm Springs (PSP) and San 
Diego (SAN). Furthermore, we also consider two hypothetical Hyperloop stations: Hyperloop 
North (HYN), which is located in downtown Oakland, and Hyperloop South (HYS), located in the 
San Fernando Valley as suggested by SpaceX (2013). Figure 2 shows the geographic location of 
our sample airports and Hyperloop stations. 
 
Figure 2. Sample airports and hypothetical Hyperloop stations 
Sources: SpaceX (2013), Own elaboration. 
Table 1 provides a few traffic and connectivity statistics for our sample airports in long-distance 
domestic markets. When evaluating the level of air travel connectivity offered by the different 
regions and airport systems, we consider both the combined total weekly frequencies (i.e., flight 
departures) as well as the number of different non-stop destinations served. For the purposes of this 
paper, the main message is that South California and Los Angeles have better overall long-distance 
air travel connectivity than North California and the San Francisco Bay Area, thus indicating the 
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existence of a connectivity gap that supports the hypothesis that passenger leakage between North 
and South California could be observed if a high-speed Hyperloop service linked both regions. For 
example, all Bay Area airports combined serve 59 different non-stop destinations, while by flying 
non-stop from Los Angeles (even exclusively from LAX) one could reach up to 81 destinations in 
other US states. In addition, the total non-stop frequencies (weekly departures) is also 38% higher 
in Los Angeles than in the Bay Area which suggests increased choice for passengers in terms of 
departure times. In spite of that, a demand leakage in the opposite direction could also be observed 
between the airports that are closest to the hypothetical Hyperloop stations: OAK and BUR. 
Residents or visitors in the San Fernando Valley with improved accessibility to OAK may wish to 
travel North for an increased choice of frequencies and destinations, with respect to those provided 
at Burbank. These opposing connectivity gaps make difficult to predict what the net effect on 
passenger transfer flows could be. 
Table 1. Overview of sample airports: average week June 2015 
Airport 
Total departing 
passengers 
Total 
frequencies 
Non-stop 
destinations 
San Francisco (SFO) 224,326 2,760 51 
Oakland (OAK) 64,044 766 32 
San Jose (SJC) 58,556 718 22 
Sacramento (SMF) 53,583 670 20 
Fresno (FAT) 8,695 152 7 
Total Bay Area 346,926 4,244 59 
Total North 409,204 5,066 59 
Los Angeles (LAX) 328,333 4,409 81 
San Diego (SAN) 131,316 1,447 40 
Santa Ana (SNA) 59,379 645 14 
Ontario (ONT) 21,868 306 9 
Burbank (BUR) 19,757 312 7 
Long Beach (LGB) 16,211 187 9 
Palm Springs (PSP) 5,274 120 9 
Total Los Angeles metro 445,548 5,859 81 
Total South 582,138 7,426 81 
Sources: OAG Traffic Analyser, OAG Schedules Analyser. 
These airports are assumed to serve passengers originating from the 1,541 zip-code areas located 
within three hours driving time from any of them. The selected zip-code areas have 37.7 million 
Californian residents (data for 2014), on top of an unaccounted number of visitors, the vast majority 
of them living or staying in places where more than one departure airport is available to commence 
their long-distance travel.  
2.2 Baseline scenario 
Passengers are assumed to make a choice of departure airport given their place of residence (or 
stay), ultimate destination, and other factors related to the attractiveness of each travel alternative. 
To the extent access time is a key driver of demand for a particular departure airport, modelling 
passenger choice will allow us to determine the catchment areas of each of our sample airports and 
how these catchment areas could be affected by the introduction of the Hyperloop. To that end, we 
adapt the simplified Multinomial Logit (MNL) structure proposed by Lieshout (2012) and Lieshout 
et al. (2015). Uzod denotes the log-utility (i.e., attractiveness) of a travel alternative involving origin 
airport o (also referred as departure airport), for passengers in the market from zip-code z to 
destination airport d. This is calculated as follows: 
𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑 = ln(𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑜𝑑) + 𝛼(𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑧𝑜 + 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑑) 
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑧𝑜 = 𝑎𝑣. 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑜 , 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑧𝑜 , 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑧𝑜 , 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑧𝑜 , 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑦𝑧𝑜, 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑜)
+ 𝑎𝑣. 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 (𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑧𝑜 , 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑧𝑜 , 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑧𝑜 , 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑧𝑜, 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑦𝑧𝑜 , 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑜) ∙ 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑇𝑇 
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𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑑 = 𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑜𝑑 + [𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑜𝑑 + 𝜇𝑜𝑑 ∙ (𝜌𝐶𝑇 ∙ 𝐶𝑇𝑜𝑑 + 𝜌𝑇𝑇 ∙ 𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑑)] ∙ 𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑉𝑇𝑇 
The log-utility of a given travel alternative depends on two principal factors: 1) the log of the 
weekly frequency of air transport services between the set origin and destination airports (freqod), 
and 2) the generalized travel costs for the passengers, which include both the cost of access from 
the place of residence or stay to the departure airport (access costzo) and the cost of flying (flight 
costod). Despite the well-established heterogeneity in preferences according to travel purpose (e.g. 
Hess and Polak, 2006; Johnson et al., 2014), we do not have disaggregated bookings data to 
separate between business and leisure passengers. Hence, all measures explained below refer to 
all-purpose travel, with an internal weighting of 70% leisure, 30% business when required, as 
approximated from the latest airline passenger surveys from LAX and SFO airports (LAWA, 2016; 
SFO, 2015). Table 2 below summarizes the definitions and data sources for all the components of 
our MNL model.  
Table 2. Summary of definitions and data sources for MNL model in baseline scenario (no Hyperloop) 
Element Definition Value Data Source 
Freqod Weekly air frequencies (direct and indirect) between 
origin airport o and destination airport d. 
 OAG Schedules 
α Sensibility of passenger utility to generalized travel costs: 
all-purpose travel 
Calibrated with data on airline 
passenger surveys 
Lieshout (2012) 
Access costod Generalized access cost for passengers Monetary cost plus time cost. Modal splits for each airport were 
obtained from airport passenger 
surveys. Driving times and 
distances for private transportation 
are calculated using ArcGIS. 
Carzo Access time and cost for private car USD 0.168 per passenger-km AAA (2015), (TSDC, 2016) 
Rentalzo Access time and cost for rental car 32% of taxi costs per km VTPI (2017) 
Taxizo Access time and cost for taxi  Various online sources 
Sharedzo Access time and cost for carsharing  Various online sources 
Courtesyzo Access time for courtesy transport   
Transitzo Access time and cost for public transit  MTC (2016)  
surfaceVTT Value of Travel Time Savings for local surface transport: 
all-purpose travel 
USD 16.42 to reflect a 70/30 per 
cent split between leisure and 
business travel, respectively. 
DOT (2014) 
Flight costod Generalized cost of flight for passenger Airfares plus flight time costs  
Avg. fareod Average airfare in the market from o to d  DB1B Dataset (DOT, 2015) 
NSTod Non-stop travel time from o to d  OAG Schedules Analyser 
CTod, TTod CT = Circuitry time (indirect flight distance over non-stop 
travel distance); TT = Transfer time for connecting 
itineraries 
 OAG Connections Analyser 
µod ,ρCT, ρTT ρCT = penalty factor for circuitry time, ρTT  = penalty factor 
for transfer time. µod = penalty factor for both CT and TT. 
ρCT = 1.7 and ρTT  = 1.36  to 
reflect a 70/30 per cent split 
between leisure and business 
travel, respectively. 
 μod = 3-0.075·NSTod 
Lieshout (2012) 
airVTT Value of Travel Time Savings for long-distance air and 
HSR transport: all-purpose travel 
USD 42.31 to reflect a 70/30 per 
cent split between leisure and 
business travel, respectively. 
DOT (2014) 
The value of freqod is calculated by identifying all direct (non-stop) and indirect airline itineraries 
between airports o and d, using our data on airline bookings and schedules from OAG. The 
information on airline bookings comes disaggregated by ticketing airline and flight itinerary (e.g. 
278 bookings for United Airlines serving LAX-EWR-BOS). Thus, it reveals not only the split 
between direct and indirect travel, but also provides detailed information about the airports that 
served as intermediate hubs in each od market. The schedules data is then brought in to find all 
flights (or flight combinations) delivered by the ticketing airline that could have served those real-
world bookings. A simple connections-building algorithm, based on airline partnerships and 
published minimum connecting times (also sourced from OAG), reveals the fastest available 
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connections for each indirect itinerary. A maximum connecting time of one hour above the fastest 
connection is set to retain only the competitive travel options (as in Voltes-Dorta et al., 2017). After 
that, the total number of bookings recorded for a given itinerary is distributed across all identified 
flight combinations according to seat capacity. This allows us to calculate passenger-weighted 
average values of the quality of od air connectivity later on.  
An implicit coefficient of 1 for the logged frequency is imposed by the simplified MNL model, 
which establishes a linear relationship between flight frequency and travel utility. Past papers on 
airport choice in the Bay area (Pels et al., 2003; Hess and Polak, 2006) offer estimates ranging from 
0.72 to 1.44 for summer data, depending on travel purpose. Appendix A provides a sensitivity 
analysis employing the values 0.8 and 1.3 for the frequency coefficient.  
The first component of flying costs is the average airfare in each od pair, expressed in USD (avg. 
fareod). Data on airfares has been sourced from the well-known DB1B database maintained by the 
US Department of Transportation (DOT, 2015). Since the fares are itinerary-specific, these are 
merged with our OAG itineraries so passenger-weighted averages can be calculated. The second 
component of flying costs is the cost of travel time itself. For each od pair, this is calculated by 
multiplying the average total air travel time (in hours) by the relevant value of time (airVTT). For 
this case study, we use USD 42.31 per person-hour following the guidance of DOT (2014). Average 
total travel time is disaggregated into three components (Lieshout, 2012): 1) non-stop travel time 
(NSTod): for itineraries without non-stop travel options, a hypothetical direct travel time (in hours) 
is calculated as a function of great-circle distance between airports o and d and an average speed 
based on the most common type of aircraft flying on the relevant distance range. 2) Passenger-
weighted average circuitry time (CTod): it refers to the excess flying time (in hours) associated to 
indirect travel options with respect to NST. 3) Passenger-weighted average transfer time (TTod): it 
refers to the total time spent at intermediate airports to change flights in indirect travel options. 
Both CT and TT are calculated from the output of the connections-building algorithm described 
above. These extra travel times are perceived as more inconvenient for the passengers the shorter 
the NST is. Hence, a generic penalty factor is introduced for both CT and TT (μod = 3-0.075·NSTod), 
as recommended by de Wit et al. (2009), followed by specific penalty factors for CT (ρCT=1.7), 
and TT (ρTT=1.36), based on the reference values from Lieshout (2012). The higher the CT and TT 
averages, the worse the quality of airline connectivity in the od pair, as the airlines in airport o 
depend more on indirect connections to reach destination d. Passengers could potentially trade-off 
higher access times in exchange of lower air travel times by driving to a more distant airport that 
has a higher proportion of non-stop frequencies. The chosen values are taken directly from Lieshout 
(2012) since there is no practical way to calibrate them individually with our available data2. A 
sensitivity analysis with values 10% higher and lower for ρCT and ρTT is provided in Appendix A.  
In regards to the access costs, the first component is the explicit cost of ground transport between 
z and o. This is calculated as a weighted average of the costs of six access mode categories: private 
car, rental car, taxi/Uber, shared/door-to-door shuttle, courtesy van, and public transit. Each 
departure airport has its own modal split, indicated in Table 3. This data was obtained from the 
latest passenger surveys of LAX, SFO, SNA, and BUR that are available online, though for the 
latter the survey dates to 2008. For OAK and SJC, the data comes from the Metropolitan Transport 
Commission’s (MTC) periodic passenger surveys of airports in the Bay area. The latest version for 
                                                     
2 In a typical 3-hour NST itinerary, the penalty factors lead to implied values of time of USD 199.6/h and USD 159.7/h 
for CT and TT, respectively. These values fall comfortably within the implicit ranges used by Lieshout (2012): between 
USD 108.2/h and USD 283/h, depending on travel motive. 
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OAK is from 2006 and for SJC from 2002. The remaining airports assume the modal split of their 
closest comparable point of reference, except the relatively isolated FAT and PSP airports, which 
are given generic modal splits based on the station categories defined by CHSR (2011). 
Table 3. Ground access modes for airports and Hyperloop stations 
Access Mode SFO OAK SJC HYN SMF FAT LAX SNA BUR HYS SAN LGB ONT PSP 
Private – own car (%) 39 56 67 56 67 87 47 56 66 66 66 66 66 87 
Private – rental (%) 12 16 19 16 19 3 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 3 
Taxi/Car sharing (%) 29 5 7 5 7 3 24 15 9 9 9 9 9 3 
Shared/Shuttle (%) 6 6 3 6 3 3 9 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Courtesy van (%) 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 6 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Public Transit (%) 10 15 2 15 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sources: LAWA (2016), SFO (2015), JWA (2015), BUR (2008), MTC (2007), MTC (2003), CHSR (2011), Own Elaboration 
Driving times and distances between all zip codes and the relevant airports are calculated with a 
commercial Geographical Information System (GIS). The costs per km of using an owned car to 
get to the airport is USD 0.303, including fuel, maintenance, insurance, taxes, and depreciation as 
estimated by AAA (2015). This is converted to USD 0.168 per passenger-km once we assume an 
average of 1.81 passengers using data from the 2012 California Household Travel Survey (TSDC, 
2016). The same reference is used to obtain passenger-km costs for all other modes (except public 
transit). Average taxi and Uber fares per km at a city/county level were easily compiled from a 
variety of online sources. For simplicity, we assume 50% split between traditional taxi and Uber 
or similar services. For paid door-to-door shuttle services, a sample of routes between the airports 
and selected destinations was collected and an average price per passenger-km then derived by 
simple regression analysis, in similar fashion than Pels et al., (2003). Average rental costs per km 
were calculated as 32% of taxi costs per km, following the benchmarks provided by VTPI (2017). 
Due to the very low proportion of public transit access to the airports in South California, this travel 
option is only included for the three airports in the Bay Area (Caltrain and local buses give service 
to SFO, OAK, and SJC, while the Bay Area Rapid Transit – BART serves the first two). Public 
transit times and travel costs (in 2000 dollars) between our zip-codes3 and the departure airports 
were obtained using the origin-and-destination metropolitan travel forecasts for 2015 developed by 
MTC (2016). The travel costs were converted to 2015 dollars. 
The second component of access costs is the cost of access time. For each zo pair, this is calculated 
by multiplying the weighted average surface access time (in hours) by the relevant value of time 
(surfaceVTT). For this case study, we use USD 16.42 per person-hour following DOT (2014). 
Finally, the coefficient alpha (α) represents the sensitivity of passenger utility to generalized travel 
costs. Given all the other parameters of the model, alpha was calibrated with the objective to 
minimize the average absolute deviation between the actual and predicted geographic distribution 
of departing passengers by county of origin for LAX and SFO airports. A value of α=-0.0265 was 
obtained4. Table 4 shows the actual and predicted geographic distribution for the base model 
assumptions (without Hyperloop). The actual distribution that serves as benchmark comes from 
the respective passenger survey reports. 
Table 4. Actual and predicted distribution of originating passengers at LAX and SFO airports 
SFO  LAX 
Counties of Origin Actual Predicted  Counties of Origin Actual Predicted 
                                                     
3 We linked each of our zip-code areas to the closest MTC travel analysis zone (TAZ) using GIS.  
4 Taking the value α = -0.02 as reference (Lieshout, 2012), an exhaustive search was done in the interval (-0.01, -0.03). 
The lower the value, the higher the penalty to counties located farther away from the airport. The average absolute 
deviation per airport around the optimal solution α = -0.0265 ranges between 10-11% but is always higher as we move 
away from it. 
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San Francisco 46% 46%  Los Angeles 71% 68% 
San Mateo 14% 19%  Orange County 14% 18% 
Santa Clara 11% 10%  San Bernardino 4% 4% 
Alameda 10% 10%  Ventura 4% 2% 
Contra Costa 5% 4%  Riverside 3% 4% 
Marin 4% 2%  San Diego 2% 3% 
Sonoma 3% 2%  Santa Barbara 2% 1% 
Napa 2% 1%  Kern <1% <1% 
Solano 1% 1%  Tulare <1% <1% 
Sources: LAWA (2016), SFO (2015), Own elaboration. 
After calculating Uzod, we can distribute the number of bookings per od pair across all zip-codes as 
follows: 
𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑 (𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒) = 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑜𝑑
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑)∙𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑧
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑)𝑧 ∙𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑧
, 
𝑝𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑧 = (%𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑧
𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑧
max (𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑧)
+ %𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑧
𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑧
max (𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑧)
), 
where Pzod (baseline) denotes the number of od passengers estimated to have started their journey in 
zip-code z. This value is proportional to the product of travel utility exp(Uzod) and the travel 
potential of z (potentialz) against all other zip-codes in airport o’s catchment area. The potential of 
zip-code z to generate resident and visitor air travel is calculated as the weighted average of the 
normalized5 airfare expenditures by residents and the normalized visitor sales revenue (data 
provided at a zip code level by Esri and extracted with ArcGIS online, in combination with the 
county-level data reported in Visit California, 2015). %resident and %visitor refer to the split of 
potential passengers by travel purpose originating from each zip code. These weights take the value 
of the closest airport for which travel purpose data is available. 
Aggregating Pzod by origin airport results in the total passengers that travel between z and d (Pzd). 
This becomes an important reference measurement for the next stage, as passengers in each zd 
market re-evaluate their choice of departure airport o after the introduction of the Hyperloop.  
𝑃𝑧𝑑 = ∑ 𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑
𝑜
 
2.3 Hyperloop scenario 
The scenario with the Hyperloop employs the same MNL model, with the addition of new travel 
alternatives generated by the Hyperloop service6. In addition, a number of sub-scenarios are run 
for a sensitivity analysis of the impact of two Hyperloop level-of-service attributes: fares and 
station processing times (See Table 5). The new Hyperloop itineraries always involve 
residents/visitors in Northern California departing from a South California airport and vice-versa. 
These new travel alternatives, have different access costs, which are now split in three stages: 1) 
travel from z to the nearest Hyperloop station, 2) Hyperloop transfer, and 3) transfer from the 
arriving Hyperloop station to departure airport o. Stage 1 employs the modal splits from Table 3 to 
access the Hyperloop stations, which are taken from the nearby OAK and BUR airports, and also 
                                                     
5 Values are normalized by dividing by the largest value across all zip codes in the sample. 
6 One could argue that travel alternatives should be grouped into “local” vs “Hyperloop” ones. Indeed, the pattern of 
substitution between any local departure and a Hyperloop-assisted one is likely to depend on other local alternatives 
available. This violates the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that is implicit in the MNL 
model. Clearly a Nested Logit (NL) specification would be more suitable. However, the NL option requires us to model 
the utilities at a branch level, leading to different parameters for the Hyperloop travel alternatives for which no 
published references or data are yet available for calibration purposes. This leads to the MNL simplification and 
explains why the present contribution remains largely exploratory in nature. 
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employs surfaceVTT for the time valuation. Stage 2 assumes the announced 35-minute travel time 
between Oakland and the San Fernando Valley, valued at airVTT levels (which are also applicable 
to high-speed rail travel), plus either 15-min or 30-min station processing times (this includes both 
access and egress), valued at USD 26.29 per person-hour (DOT, 2014). In regards to the Hyperloop 
fare, the original Hyperloop proposal indicated a one-way ticket price of USD 20 (SpaceX, 2013) 
to recover capital costs. Since there is no practical way to provide an accurate estimate of operating 
costs per passenger for the Hyperloop, we assume USD 30 calculated from the California HSR 
Annual Ridership and Operating Cost documentation (CHSR, 2011). This provides a more 
conservative ticket price of USD 50 for the Hyperloop. Two additional sub-scenarios with USD 30 
and USD 70 are also run for a sensitivity analysis. Stage 3 assumes the modal split characteristic 
for the departure airport but removing the two car-driving options, thus relying primarily on 
taxi/carsharing, prearranged shuttles, and public transit. In order to penalize the Hyperloop access 
alternative for the lack of seamlessness in the transfer from the station to the departing airport (a 
key feature of good air-rail intermodality; Goetz and Vowles, 2010), the access time in Stage 3 is 
valued at airVTT levels with the same penalty factor as airline transfer times. This effectively 
makes the Stage 3 transfer an additional leg in the passenger’s flight itinerary.  
One can also expect a reaction from the incumbent airlines to the introduction of the Hyperloop. 
Airlines could reduce frequencies and/or increase fares to compensate for reduced load factors due 
to leakage of demand to Hyperloop, or they could attempt to retain market share by lowering fares. 
In a comprehensive review of studies about air-HSR competition, Albalate et al. (2015) notes that 
reductions in either airline fares or frequencies are common after the introduction of HSR routes 
that compete directly with air corridors7. In order to incorporate these effects into our simplified 
MNL structure, we refer to the Ridership and Revenue forecast model developed for the California 
HSR 2012 Business Plan (Cambridge Systematics, 2012). Due to the lack of an HSR scenario in 
California, the authors base their analysis on the competitive responses to the entry of Virgin 
America in the SFO-LAX market in 2007 and the SFO-SAN market in 2008. We use two of their 
competitive response sub-scenarios: a) no fare changes, and b) a 9% reduction in fares (derived 
from the above case studies). It is unclear, though, whether the generalized reduction in fares will 
have a positive or negative impact on demand for the Hyperloop-facilitated air routes, since these 
become cheaper as well. No scenario with changing frequencies was developed because our model 
does not contemplate leakage of demand from air to Hyperloop in long-distance markets (the 
leakage is between airports). This can only be implemented in the context of a wider-scope study 
that considers short-distance markets as well, which has a much larger complexity and it is left for 
future research. In total, eight Hyperloop sub-scenarios are run (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Sub-scenarios for the Hyperloop case 
Sub-scenario no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Airfare competitive response No change No change No change No change 9% reduction 9% reduction 9% reduction 9% reduction 
Hyperloop one-way fares (USD) 30 50 50 70 30 50 50 70 
Station transfer (min) 15 15 30 30 15 15 30 30 
2.4 Measuring change in airport competition 
Once the new travel utilities are determined, the passenger demand between zip-codes and 
destination airports established in the baseline scenario (Pzd) is re-distributed across departure 
airports. New travel routes involving a Hyperloop transfer are denoted with the subscript +h, and 
                                                     
7 While most published empirical evidence on these strategic interactions comes from European and Asian case studies, 
Behrens and Pels (2012) adapted their European results to the California HSR case. 
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their market shares are determined in the usual fashion: a ratio of their travel utility 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑+ℎ) to 
total utility of all travel alternatives in the market, with and without Hyperloop: ∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑±ℎ)𝑜 , i.e. 
𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑+ℎ = 𝑃𝑧𝑑
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑+ℎ)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑±ℎ)𝑜
, 
where Pzod+h denotes the number of od passengers estimated to have started their journey in zip-
code z, and involving a Hyperloop transfer.  
Pre-existing routes, which can either keep their baseline traffic or leak passengers to airport-
Hyperloop alternatives, are denoted with the subscript –h. Their level of traffic in this new scenario 
(Pzod-h) is calculated by diminishing the baseline forecast in the same proportion captured by 
Hyperloop routes: 
𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑−ℎ = 𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑 (𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒) [1 −
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑+ℎ)𝑜
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑈𝑧𝑜𝑑±ℎ)𝑜
] 
Aggregating Pzod (baseline) by destination delivers the total passengers that travel between z and o in 
the baseline scenario: Pzo (baseline). Aggregating Pzod+h and Pzod-h by destination delivers the total 
passengers that travel between z and o in the Hyperloop scenario: Pzo±h. From that, calculating the 
market share of airport o for residents or visitors in z (Szo and Szo±h) is straightforward. 
𝑃𝑧𝑜 = ∑ 𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑
𝑑
;      𝑆𝑧𝑜 =
𝑃𝑧𝑜
∑ 𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑜
 
𝑃𝑧𝑜±ℎ = ∑ 𝑃𝑧𝑜𝑑±ℎ
𝑑
;      𝑆𝑧𝑜±ℎ =
𝑃𝑧𝑜±ℎ
∑ 𝑃𝑧𝑜±ℎ𝑜
 
This step allows us to measure the degree of concentration in airport market shares at a zip-code 
level (as a proxy for competition) using the well-known Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index. Both before 
and after estimates are provided (HHIz and HHIz±h): 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑧 = ∑ (𝑆𝑧𝑜)
2
𝑜
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑧±ℎ = ∑ (𝑆𝑧𝑜±ℎ)
2
𝑜
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The potential short-term impact of a hypothetical California Hyperloop service on airport 
competition is shown in Figure 3, which indicates the percentage change in HHI index 
(Delta_HHIz) between the baseline and two Hyperloop scenarios (Scenario 5, with low airfares and 
the best level-of-service attributes for the Hyperloop, and scenario 4 with the opposite 
characteristics) for the zip-codes in the Bay Area and Los Angeles. Overall, the average HHI per 
zip code is predicted to decrease in all cases. However, different geographical patterns can be 
observed depending on the region analyzed. In the Bay area, the greatest increase in competition 
(between 22% and 29% decrease in HHI) would be observed in the North Bay, covering most of 
Marin County, but also parts of Sonoma, Napa, Solano, and Contra Costa. A significant increase 
in competition is also predicted for the zip-codes around SFO, OAK, SJC airports, and the 
Hyperloop North station. This covers the entire San Francisco County, a large part of San Mateo, 
and Alameda. Most of these very densely populated areas are served by BART, which allows for 
good accessibility to the Hyperloop North Station and hence, it brings SFO a new wave of 
competition from the airports at the other end of the Hyperloop line.  
12 
 
While the increase in competition is also seen in South California, is has a noticeably smaller 
magnitude. Indeed, the geographic location of the Hyperloop South Station in the San Fernando 
Valley results in a completely different picture. Most residents and visitors to the South of Los 
Angeles have easier accessibility to LAX than to the Hyperloop, thus allowing LAX to retain a 
higher amount of “captive” passengers in a way that SFO cannot. This is how the light shaded areas 
in Figure 3 can be interpreted (decrease in HHI always lower than 10%). The closer the zip-code 
is to the San Fernando Valley, the higher the competitive pressure (note the impact on BUR 
airport), with the passengers originating from the North of Los Angeles County experiencing the 
highest increase in airport choice with the introduction of the Hyperloop.  
 
Figure 3. Changes in HHI index in selected scenarios 
Source: Own elaboration. 
One implication of the above results is that the California airport network could experience a drastic 
move towards a single airport system due to the time-space compression facilitated by the 
Hyperloop service. In that context, the scope of geographic competition will be vastly expanded 
from its current boundaries to have North and South airports competing directly with one another 
for passengers originating in either region. In this context, are there any airports that would be 
particularly threatened by the increased competition?  
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Table 6. Predicted weekly passenger traffic at sample airports in both baseline and Hyperloop scenarios (June 2015) 
Airport \ scenario Baseline 
Hyperloop Max 
Change (%) 
Min 
Change (%) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
San Francisco (SFO) 224,326 198,962 202,621 210,142 214,022 200,234 203,715 210,846 214,522 -10.7% -4.6% 
Oakland (OAK) 64,044 77,527 75,449 71,377 69,329 75,335 73,596 70,236 68,551 17.6% 8.3% 
San Jose (SJC) 58,556 52,816 53,520 54,985 55,772 52,948 53,640 55,077 55,848 -9.6% -4.8% 
Sacramento (SMF) 53,583 45,787 46,665 48,552 49,610 45,947 46,813 48,672 49,715 -14.3% -7.4% 
Fresno (FAT) 8,695 8,231 8,282 8,392 8,454 8,243 8,293 8,401 8,462 -5.2% -2.8% 
Total Bay Area 346,926 329,304 331,590 336,503 339,123 328,517 330,951 336,159 338,921 -5.3% -2.2% 
Total North 409,204 383,323 386,536 393,447 397,187 382,707 386,056 393,232 397,098 -6.5% -2.9% 
Los Angeles (LAX) 328,333 350,724 348,376 343,139 340,141 351,615 349,095 343,509 340,334 7.1% 3.6% 
San Diego (SAN) 131,316 129,550 129,832 130,371 130,633 129,685 129,947 130,443 130,684 -1.2% -0.5% 
Santa Ana (SNA) 59,379 56,573 56,989 57,797 58,206 56,830 57,207 57,935 58,304 -4.3% -2.0% 
Ontario (ONT) 21,868 20,792 20,931 21,207 21,354 20,839 20,972 21,237 21,379 -4.7% -2.3% 
Burbank (BUR) 19,757 28,158 26,490 23,318 21,871 27,545 25,977 23,024 21,688 39.4% 10.7% 
Long Beach (LGB) 16,211 17,255 17,177 16,965 16,808 17,136 17,062 16,857 16,709 5.7% 3.7% 
Palm Springs (PSP) 5,274 4,967 5,011 5,098 5,141 4,985 5,026 5,107 5,147 -5.5% -2.5% 
Total Los Angeles metro 445,548 473,502 469,962 462,426 458,381 473,965 470,313 462,561 458,413 6.4% 2.9% 
Total South 582,138 608,019 604,806 597,895 594,155 608,635 605,286 598,110 594,244 4.6% 2.1% 
Note: Maximum change is calculated as the difference between baseline and scenario 5, Minimum change against scenario 4. 
Table 6 shows the predicted weekly passenger traffic at our sample airports in both the baseline 
and Hyperloop scenarios. Out of the eight alternatives, Scenario 5 is to be the most optimistic one 
(cheapest Hyperloop service, fastest station processing, and unchanged airline fares). Scenario 4, 
which represents the other end of the spectrum, is clearly the most pessimistic one. Regardless of 
the scenario, however, it is clear that a travel time of 35 minutes from Downtown Oakland to the 
San Fernando Valley can make airports like Burbank, Long Beach, or Los Angeles very attractive 
choices for residents in the Bay Area. Conversely, residents in Southern California would benefit 
from improved accessibility to Oakland Airport. Directional traffic flows are imbalanced, though. 
Airports in North California are predicted to lose more weekly passengers than those gained from 
competitors in South California. This conclusion is robust to changes in the model coefficients (See 
Appendix A for a sensitivity analysis). Depending on the scenario, the leakage effect represents a 
reduction in traffic between 2.9% and 6.5% (2.2% and 5.3% for the Bay Area airport system). In 
the North, SFO airport is the one most negatively affected since it serves the largest amount of 
frequencies and destinations in direct competition with the South airports and LAX. In addition, it 
being located at a relatively distant location from the Hyperloop North Station reduces the potential 
to capture Southern residents or visitors. This justifies the positive prospects for OAK, which is 
predicted to achieve an increase in traffic due to the easy access to the new transport mode. The 
southern counterpart is BUR, which, despite the evident connectivity gap against OAK (shown in 
table 1), is also able to capture more passengers from the North than those that leak away. In the 
end, however, it is LAX, with its dominance in destinations and frequencies, the airport that 
benefits the most (in terms of passenger traffic) from the introduction of the Hyperloop, with a 
predicted increase in long-distance domestic passenger traffic between 3.6% and 7.1%. This agrees 
with our working hypothesis for the paper, that the airport with the largest level of service would 
benefit the most from collaborating with the Hyperloop, as previously documented for HSR in 
European case studies (Terpstra and Lijesen, 2014). In spite of that, a few secondary airports in the 
South, like SNA and ONT, which do not have the same amount of connectivity than the secondary 
airports in the North, are predicted to experience a net reduction in traffic. This suggests that the 
introduction of the Hyperloop could lead to a shift in airport roles within the Californian airport 
system, with substantial changes in how these airports rank against one another in terms of 
passenger traffic. While the Bay area would move towards a more balanced distribution of traffic 
across its airports, passenger traffic in the South would become more concentrated in LAX. 
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Figure 4 shows the predicted catchment areas for the Hyperloop North and Hyperloop South 
Stations, which effectively show how the South Airports would penetrate the North region and vice 
versa. The new transport mode is predicted to serve between 30 and 75 thousand and weekly airline 
passengers that depart from an airport in a local area different from the one in which they reside. 
This represents between 3% and 7.5% of the total passenger traffic in long-distance domestic 
markets. The optimistic market shares of Hyperloop-facilitated air routes vary between 8% and 
22% in the North region (between 4% and 12% in the pessimistic one), while the same market 
shares in the South vary from 1% to 12%. An interesting effect of the introduction of the Hyperloop, 
as planned without intermediate stations between Oakland and the San Fernando Valley, is the 
creation of discontinuous catchment areas for Californian airports. This is bound to have a 
disrupting effect on how airport and airline advertising would be carried out, with marketing 
campaigns now extending beyond the local region to reach passengers on the other side of the 
Hyperloop line. 
 
Figure 4. Catchment areas of Hyperloop Stations in selected scenarios 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 7 delivers additional insights on the reasons behind the passenger leakage. It shows the top 
10 largest North-to-South leaking markets for SFO airport, and provides a comparative analysis of 
airfares, the quality of air connectivity, and average access cost differentials between SFO and the 
equivalent airline itinerary via LAX-Hyperloop. We can see that the gap between the two primary 
airports is mostly on air transport fares and frequencies, which offsets the increase in access costs 
from the Hyperloop transfer. It is also worth noting that average circuitry and transfer times are not 
consistently worse in SFO, despite the lower amount of direct frequencies available. The fact that 
the massive leakage is largely explained by the higher airfares at SFO suggests that the effects 
measured by this paper can only be sustained in the short-term. Any geographic price fences that 
support fare discrimination by airlines serving Californian airports will be broken by the new high-
speed travel alternative, thus possibly leading to further harmonization of prices in the medium 
term, which can also have implications in terms of airlines rationalizing services.  
Table 7. Top 10 largest North-to-South leaking passenger markets: LAX vs. SFO airports.  
Destination Market Airport Via non-stop 
weekly 
frequencies 
Avg fare 
(USD) 
non-stop 
travel time 
(min) 
Avg circuitry 
time(min) 
Avg transfer 
time(min) 
Avg access costs 
differential (USD) 
(min)            (max) 
Hyperloop 
transfers 
(min)         (max) 
Orlando (MCO) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 568 322 277 20 17 77.4 154.0 1,191 3,041 
SFO  467 348 304 42 31     
Washington (IAD) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 419 405 290 7 6 77.1 153.7 598 1,935 
SFO  423 490 303 7 6     
Denver (DEN) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 488 194 139 4 3 76.0 152.6 517 1,812 
SFO  381 271 149 6 5     
Tampa (TPA) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 363 301 265 34 28 73.4 150.0 1,294 1,800 
SFO  308 321 325 53 76     
San Antonio (SAT) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 316 228 166 9 8 74.2 150.8 1,632 1,716 
SFO  231 287 202 46 46     
Boston (BOS) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 791 354 323 12 11 77.5 154.1 319 1,330 
SFO  620 414 333 11 10     
Detroit (DTW) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 454 323 268 18 18 77.0 153.6 478 1,289 
SFO  317 393 271 23 23     
Austin (AUS) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 358 222 172 9 8 76.2 152.7 346 1,187 
SFO  270 285 205 10 12     
Indianapolis (IND) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 344 290 246 23 21 75.9 152.4 502 1,180 
SFO  285 312 256 41 40     
Washington (DCA) 
 
LAX Hyperloop 569 323 291 27 24 76.2 152.8 362 1,090 
SFO  435 391 300 32 28   
 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In a context of debate about the economic viability of new transport modes and their impact on 
existing modes, this paper investigates how a hypothetical Hyperloop service connecting San 
Francisco and Los Angeles’ metropolitan areas could affect the level of competition between 
California’s major airports in long-distance domestic markets. To that end, we adapt an established 
method to determine airport catchment areas based on weekly flight frequencies, access times, and 
generalized travel costs as the main drivers or passenger choice. The methodology combines 
publicly available data on airline bookings for June 2015 (obtained from the US Department of 
Transportation), OAG flight schedules, and additional information on local population and 
transport accessibility that was compiled using Geographical Information Systems and airport-
specific passenger surveys.  
Our results clearly predict a substantial short-term increase in airport competition for travellers 
originating in most municipalities in California and travelling to other US states. A travel time of 
35 minutes from Downtown Oakland to the San Fernando Valley can make airports like Burbank, 
Long Beach, or Los Angeles very attractive choices for residents in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
Conversely, residents in Southern California would benefit from improved accessibility to Oakland 
Airport. As a result, the average HHI in the selected markets, measured at a zip-code level, is 
predicted to decrease as the California airport network will move towards a single airport system 
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due to the time-space compression facilitated by the Hyperloop service. The new transport mode 
is predicted to serve between 30 and 75 thousand weekly airline passengers that plan to depart from 
an airport in an area different from the one in which they reside. This represents between 3% and 
7.5% of the total passenger traffic in long-distance domestic markets. Directional traffic flows are 
imbalanced, however, creating a significant leakage of airport traffic from North to South 
California, explained by the gap in air transport fares and frequencies that offsets the increase in 
access costs from the Hyperloop transfer. In terms of  absolute passenger numbers, Los Angeles 
Airport is predicted to benefit the most from the Hyperloop in the markets from California to the 
rest of the US, while San Francisco Airport would be the one most negatively affected. 
Due to the degree of interest shown by academics and several local authorities in regards to the 
development of Hyperloop services in different markets all over the world, the substantial effects 
on airport competition in long-distance air transport markets should be taken into consideration in 
the respective economic impact assessments, particularly if the route connects major cities with 
separate airport systems. From the perspective of airport management, investing in better surface 
accessibility, as well as improving direct connectivity to domestic destinations, thus reducing 
passenger travel costs, can be two ways to offset the increased competition and prevent passenger 
leakage. From the perspective of airline pricing, once the geographic price fence is compromised 
by the high-speed travel alternative, one can expect a short-term adjustment towards less 
geographic price discrimination. Indeed, the increase in passenger choice created by the Hyperloop 
can be expected to put an overall downward pressure on airfares, an effect considered by our model, 
but we submit that the ultimate impact is difficult to predict due to possible consolidation of 
frequencies by airlines within a single, state-wide catchment area. On top of that, there are the 
unaccounted economic impacts related to the improved air connectivity to other US regions linked 
to the increase in the supply of air services accessible to most Californian municipalities, the 
quantification of which is left for future research. 
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Appendix A. Sensitivity analysis MNL model 
 
Table A1. Scenarios for sensitivity analysis 
Sub-scenario no. 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 
Airfare competitive response No change No change No change No change No change 
Hyperloop one-way fares (USD) 30 30 30 30 30 
Station transfer (min) 15 15 15 15 15 
Frequency coefficient 1 0.8 1 1.3 1.3 
Change to Lieshout (2012) CT and TT penalty factors 0% -10% -10% 0% +10% 
 
Table A2. Predicted weekly passenger traffic at sample airports in several Hyperloop scenarios (June 2015) 
Airport \ scenario 
Hyperloop Max increase 
from scenario 1 
(%) 
Max decrease 
from scenario 
1 (%) baseline 1 1a 1b 1c 1d 
San Francisco (SFO) 224,326 198,962 200,265 201,033 198,516 197,806 1.04% -0.58% 
Oakland (OAK) 64,044 77,527 81,459 77,625 73,172 73,029 5.07% -5.80% 
San Jose (SJC) 58,556 52,816 53,376 53,292 52,486 52,226 1.06% -1.12% 
Sacramento (SMF) 53,583 45,787 46,290 46,345 45,528 45,261 1.22% -1.15% 
Fresno (FAT) 8,695 8,231 8,253 8,259 8,224 8,211 0.34% -0.25% 
Total Bay Area 346,926 329,304 335,100 331,950 324,174 323,061 1.76% -1.90% 
Total North 409,204 383,323 389,643 386,555 377,926 376,533 1.65% -1.77% 
Los Angeles (LAX) 328,333 350,724 344,018 348,344 357,652 358,516 2.22% -1.91% 
San Diego (SAN) 131,316 129,550 129,332 129,615 129,821 129,808 0.21% -0.17% 
Santa Ana (SNA) 59,379 56,573 56,235 56,684 57,037 56,984 0.82% -0.60% 
Ontario (ONT) 21,868 20,792 20,746 20,845 20,905 20,872 0.54% -0.22% 
Burbank (BUR) 19,757 28,158 29,019 27,317 26,110 26,620 3.06% -7.27% 
Long Beach (LGB) 16,211 17,255 17,403 17,003 16,890 17,013 0.86% -2.11% 
Palm Springs (PSP) 5,274 4,967 4,945 4,979 5,001 4,997 0.68% -0.44% 
Total Los Angeles metro 445,548 473,502 467,421 470,193 478,595 480,003 1.37% -1.28% 
Total South 582,138 608,019 601,699 604,787 613,416 614,809 1.12% -1.04% 
 
The numbers above show that, as the flight-time penalty factors and the frequency coefficient 
increase, the market share of Hyperloop routes also increases (note how the predictions for sub-
scenarios 1c and 1d are the furthest away from the baseline). The maximum deviation from the 
values of scenario 1 due to changes in the MNL model parameters is 7.27% for Burbank Airport. 
However, these deviations do not affect the main implication of our results: that a leakage of 
demand should be observed from North to South Californian airports in long-distance domestic 
markets. 
